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ABSTRACT
The number of different car and light truck models produced in North America has increased
enormously over the last decades. The data suggests that producing this increased variety of vehicles
is associated with a productivity penalty. We show that manufacturers can adopt complementary
activities to reduce this penalty.  Flexible technology, defined as the ability to assemble models
derived from different “platforms” on the same assembly line, and bringing previously outsourced
activities in-house are two such activities that we identify. Both are costly themselves, in terms of
lower productivity, but they reduce the cost of producing greater variety. The results are robust to
controlling for the endogeneity of the adoption decisions using activity-specific instruments, as
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The organizational design of ﬁrms is likely to aﬀect performance in crucial ways. In the
automotive industry there is a lot of scope for such organizational decisions to matter. By
the very nature of the product, coordination problems are crucial. Each vehicle is made
up of a myriad of components which cannot all be produced by the same ﬁrm. The end
product is diﬀerentiated in many dimensions. The minimum eﬃcient scale of production
is large, possibly changing over time, and diﬀers for many activities that make up the
assembly process. Moreover, the industry is highly capital intensive and unionized which
is likely to make adjusting to a new environment more diﬃcult.
A growing literature has focused on the presence of complementarities, deﬁned as a
positive dependency between pairs of activities. One of the most inﬂuential studies of
complementarities, Milgrom and Roberts (1990), referred extensively to the automotive
industry.1 Data limitations and the importance of unobservables make it a nontrivial task
to distinguish between interdependent returns and the impact of an omitted variable on
several adoption decisions, see Athey and Stern (2003). The distinction matters crucially
to isolate the impact of an activity holding all else constant. In particular, by studying
the adoption decisions of other ﬁrms, we would like to learn what return a ﬁrm can expect
from adopting a new activity itself.
We speciﬁcally look at the impact of an expanded model lineup on plant-level pro-
ductivity. The variety of models for sale (and produced) in North America has increased
tremendously in the last decades. While the increase could to some extent be the response
to innovations in production technology, it is generally viewed as a response to changing
consumer demand and the cause of severe production diﬃculties. While some ﬁrms may
have a comparative advantage in producing a greater variety of vehicles at minimal extra
cost, other (less capable) ﬁrms follow their lead to preserve market share. In an industry
with high ﬁxed costs this is not necessarily irrational, but these ﬁrms will potentially incur
much greater cost increases or productivity declines. The following quote illustrates the
industry’s sentiment:
“All that model proliferation, of course, increased costs. [...] Today, through
1Macduﬃe (1995) and Helper (1997) are empirical studies investigating complementarities between
human resource activities in the automotive industry. Novak and Stern (2003) study complementarities
between the outsourcing decisions of major components. Jovanovic and Stolyarov (1997) illustrate a
theory of asynchronous use of complementarity technologies under learning by doing, drawing on evidence
from the automotive industry.
1bitter lessons drenched in red ink, automakers are learning to consolidate
product development and even production, while producing vehicles that are
diﬀerent enough in style to suit ﬁnicky consumers. [...] Today we have insuf-
ﬁcient volume on products, so we’re not taking advantage of the economies of
scale that we could.” Automotive News (1996)
Increasing the number of models produced in a single plant is the ﬁrst ‘activity’ we
consider. Flexible technology and insourcing (the reverse of outsourcing) are two ‘activi-
ties’ that have the potential to reduce the cost of assembling the increased variety. Both
are widely debated trends in the automotive and many other manufacturing industries.2
Note that the potential complementarities are of an unusual form. Rather than joint
adoption boosting the positive return of adoption in isolation, in our application each ac-
tivity would lower productivity on its own, but adopting them jointly potentially reduces
the productivity penalty. We do not model the implicit beneﬁts of producing greater
variety, but refer to Petrin (2002) for an illustration of the (demand-side) beneﬁts of the
introduction of the minivan.
We will investigate the potential complementarities between these three activities on
the universe of all car and light truck assembly plants in North America over the 1994–
2004 period. The empirical literature has used two approaches to study the potential
interdependence of activities. Some studies look directly at the clustering of adoption
decisions, while others look at the joint impact of activities on a performance variable,
like costs or productivity.3 As pointed out by Athey and Stern (2003), many empirical
studies ﬁnding evidence for complementarities do not allow for unobservables that might
be correlated with the adoption decision of each activity.
In some cases, one can convincingly claim that observable characteristics absorb the
majority of ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects that determine adoption. This is arguably the case in the
setting of Ichniowski et al. (1997). The performance measure is narrow (output of a single
production line); production technology is similar across observations (homogenous steel
ﬁnishing); ﬁxed-eﬀects are included; and diﬀerences in adoption are likely to be driven
by variations in the ﬁxed costs of adoption (for example knowledge about best practice
or trust between labor and management varies by ﬁrm). While automobile assembly
shares some similarities with the previous situation, the production process is a lot more
2For ﬂexibility see Gal-or (2002) or Norman (2002) and for outsourcing see Girma and Gorg (2004).
3Examples of the ﬁrst approach are Arora and Gambardella (1990), Novak and Stern (2003), Miravete
and Pern´ ıas (2005), and ˚ Astebro, Colombo, and Seri (2005). Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997),
Macduﬃe (1995), and Helper (1997) are examples of the second approach.
2complicated. Even though the general technology is similar across observations, ﬁrms
(plants) are likely to be heterogeneous in terms of their ability to implement and adjust
to innovative activities. Given that ﬁrms vary widely in their observed productivity levels,
we cannot rule out that unobserved diﬀerences in capabilities are important.4
An alternative approach is to draw inferences from the restrictions that complemen-
tarities place on the distribution of the error terms. Miravete and Pern´ ıas (2005) develop
a maximum likelihood estimator that explicitly incorporates correlation in the unobserv-
ables that enter the adoption decision of each activity. Functional form assumptions on
the return function and the distribution of unobservables allow them to derive diﬀerent
areas of support consistent with joint adoption under the existence or absence of comple-
mentarities.5
Finally, Athey and Stern (2003) demonstrate that one can construct a true test for
complementarities using activity-speciﬁc instruments, “i.e. observable factors impacting
the adoption of individual practices but independent of other practices and measured
performance. (p. 3)” Novak and Stern (2003) follow this approach and derive instruments
for the outsourcing decision of major components in a sample of luxury cars. They argue
that information on pre-existing in-house sunk investments or a limited in-house capacity
for system A are valid instruments for the outsourcing decision on system A in an equation
that explains outsourcing of some other system B.
We follow this last approach to deal with potentially correlated unobservables deter-
mining the diﬀerent adoption decisions. For model variety, we adopt the logic used in
diﬀerentiated product demand estimation and use the number of varieties produced by
competing ﬁrms as activity-speciﬁc instrument. Once we control for the market segment
of the plant’s output, this variable has no role anymore explaining productivity. The dis-
tance from the geographical center of the industry is a negative predictor for the degree
of outsourcing and it should not belong in the productivity regression after controlling
for country-ﬁxed eﬀects. For ﬂexible technology, we use the method of shift relief as
instrument as it reﬂects labor-management relations that inﬂuence the expected success
of ﬂexible production methods, but is otherwise not found to explain productivity once
4The more general nature of the activities in Arora and Gambardella (1990)—R&D agreements and
stock acquisitions—similarly warrants more caution in drawing conclusions from the documented ten-
dency for joint adoption. The activities could be complementary in use, i.e. their returns are interdepen-
dent, but other explanations cannot be ruled out.
5˚ Astebro et al. (2005) use a similar approach to distinguish between complementarities and what they
call strong one-step-ahead non-causality or strong simultaneous independence.
3nationality of the owner is controlled for.
We are not aware of any previous study that uses activity-speciﬁc instruments to es-
timate the return function directly. Existing studies that control for simultaneity have
studied the adoption decisions directly. In contrast, we infer complementarities from the
eﬀect of interactions of activities on productivity. In our application, this approach has
empirical and theoretical advantages. Most importantly, ﬁrms can acquire the capability
for an activity, e.g. ﬂexible technology, but only put it in practice when necessary. Adop-
tion is then distinct from the actual use of the activity. While this is problematic for an
equation explaining (the timing of) adoption, the return function is unaﬀected by such
distinction. The beneﬁt of ﬂexible technology or outsourcing will be more relevant when
a large variety is produced, which varies year by year. The approach extends straightfor-
wardly to continuous activity choices. For example, outsourcing decisions are observed for
almost 30 tasks. A continuous outsourcing index is more intuitive than an all or nothing
choice.
Moreover, recent theoretical models have shown that complementary inputs might be
upgraded at diﬀerent dates if upgrades involve learning (Jovanovic and Stolyarov 1997)
or ﬁxed costs (Jovanovic and Stolyarov 2000). The latter paper concludes more generally
that “complementarity does not necessarily imply comovement, not even for a single
decision maker (p. 1)”. While adoption decisions of complementary activities might not
be clustered under these circumstances, the joint impact on productivity will still exist.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing the data set
in Section 2, we discuss the three activities—model proliferation, ﬂexible technology,
and in/outsourcing—and the instruments in detail in Section 3. The empirical model
underlying the investigation of complementarities is introduced in Section 4. Results of
the analysis with robustness checks are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The plant-level information comes from The Harbour Report North America, published
in 1980, 1981, 1989, and annually from 1994 onwards. Statistics are calculated using a
uniform methodology from information supplied by the ﬁrms, supplemented with plant
visits by representatives of Harbour Consulting. Firms voluntarily agreed to provide
information to beneﬁt from the productivity benchmarking exercise Harbour performs.
The principle output of the benchmarking, the calculation of the number of hours it
4takes each plant to assemble a vehicle, will be the dependent variable in our analysis.
While quoted regularly in the trade press and daily newspapers, to our knowledge this
information has not previously been used in the economics literature.
To guarantee coverage of the universe of plants in North America and a uniform
deﬁnition of variables over time, the sample period is limited to 1994–2004.6 All car
and light truck assembly plants in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico are sampled, but some
observations are dropped because of missing values. We estimate that the ﬁnal sample
covers 95% of the plants in the industry, accounting for an even higher share of output.
Coverage is less complete for engine, transmission and stamping plants, especially in
earlier years, and these plants are not included in the analysis.
A disadvantage relative to using data collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, as in
Van Biesebroeck (2003), is the absence of capital stock information. The main advantage
is the ability to include Canadian and Mexican plants and rich information on the types
of products assembled in each plant. Relative to the data set constructed from plant
surveys by the International Motor Vehicle Program, see Macduﬃe (1995), the beneﬁt of
The Harbour Report information is the complete coverage of the North American industry
and the time dimension in the panel.
The performance measure used as dependent variable is the standard measure of (the
inverse of) labor productivity in the industry: hours-per-vehicle (hpv).7 For this to be an
informative productivity measure, one is implicitly assuming that other inputs are ﬁxed
over time and across plants or vary proportionally to output. While obviously a strong
assumption, it is not entirely implausible for the industry. Similar to the situation in
Ichniowski et al. (1997), ﬁrms share the same technology (a moving assembly line), the
production process follows the same steps (welding together stamped panels, painting the
body, and assembling all components to the vehicle) and ﬁnal products are made up of
the same set of components. The scope for substituting between diﬀerent inputs is clearly
limited. It is unlikely to be controversial to assume that materials and intermediate inputs
vary proportionally to output. Van Biesebroeck (2003) ﬁnds for U.S. assembly plants that
6Foreign producers were gradually added to the sample as they agreed to participate and the range
of information collected has also expanded over time.
7Prior to 1998 a slightly diﬀerent productivity measure was calculated: workers-per-vehicle (wpv).
This measure ignored daily ﬂuctuations in production and converted employment to full-time equivalent
workers. Because both measures are available in 1998 and 1999, all wpv statistics can be converted to
hpv using a conversion factor that varies by owner (ﬁrm) and country of location (of the plant). In all
regressions we include a pre-1998 dummy. In the robustness checks we perform the analysis excluding all
pre-1998 observations and ﬁnd virtually identical results.
5the sales-material ratio varies very little over time or between plants.
We want to argue that investments in ﬁxed capital are also relatively similar across
plants. Infrastructure investments are usually provided by local or state jurisdictions
in order to ‘level the playing ﬁeld’ in the bidding war to attract FDI, see Appel Molot
(2005). Using plant-level Census data (which contains capital stock information), Van
Biesebroeck (2003) estimates diﬀerent capital coeﬃcients for ‘lean’ or ‘mass’ technology
plants. The estimated capital elasticities are very similar, 0.136 and 0.106, and not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent even at the 10% level, even though diﬀerences in the operation of
the plants or productivity growth were large. In each regression, we include country
dummies. Only if the capital-labor substitution varies by plant within the same country
will the labor productivity measure be misleading. Wages are especially low in Mexico
and substitution of labor for capital is most likely to occur there. In a robustness check we
omit the Mexican observations and ﬁnd very similar coeﬃcient estimates of all variables
of interest. Another robustness check includes plant-ﬁxed eﬀects to absorb capital stock
diﬀerences between plants and results are again extremely similar. Finally, to capture
technological innovations embodied in the capital stock we also experimented with the
inclusion of information on the year the assembly plant was last retooled, but that variable
was always insigniﬁcant.8
For comparability reasons, the Harbour Report presents the hpv comparisons by seg-
ment. We will include segment dummies in each regression to account for the complexity
of the vehicle produced, e.g. a plant assembling luxury cars has on average a higher hpv
than a plant assembling compact cars.
While the physical productivity comparison embodied in the hpv statistics is of obvious
interest to identify complementarities in production, it would be useful to have an idea
of the wider importance of this performance measure. Unfortunately, no other plant-level
information is publicly available. One possibility would be to adjust hpv for the value of
the vehicle produced. Unfortunately, a crucial aspect of the analysis is that models are sold
in diﬀerent conﬁgurations or styles, discussed below. We do not observe the breakdown
of production by variety, while prices vary a lot (up to 100%). At the ﬁrm-level, the
Harbour Report calculates each year a comparison of North American pre-tax proﬁt per
vehicle. In most years the ranking of ﬁrms is identical to the hpv ranking, as proof of
its importance.9 At the same time, the relationship between hpv and ﬁnancial success
8Retooling is deﬁned as a capacity change of more than 10% or the introduction of a vehicle from a
diﬀerent segment. The short duration of the panel makes this variable censored for almost 50% of plants.
9For example, in 2003 the only discrepancy is that Toyota is estimated to require 2% less hpv than
6makes it also more likely that unobservables inﬂuence both productivity and successful
adjustments to new activities.
The most crucial explanatory variables in the analysis are the number of varieties
produced, ﬂexibility in production, and the extent of outsourcing. Our preferred measure
of model proliferation is the sum of the number of body styles and chassis conﬁgurations
produced in the plant; for ﬂexibility it is the number of platforms produced per production
line;10 and for outsourcing it is the average of all task-speciﬁc outsourcing dummies.
An instrument for the number of varieties produced in each plant is the average number
of varieties produced in plants that produce vehicles for the same market segment and are
owned by competing ﬁrms. Instruments for the adoption of ﬂexible technology are the size
of the plant in square footage (area) and whether shift relief is ‘mass’ or ‘tag’.11 Finally,
the extent of outsourcing is instrumented by the distance from each plant to the midpoint
of the automotive industry in North America and to the industry’s midpoint within the
plant’s country. Distances are calculated from the plants’ longitudes and latitudes and
change slightly over time as the centers shift.12 In the next Section, we discuss each of
the three activities in detail, illustrate the changes over time, and provide details on the
variable construction and the intuition for the instruments.
Control variables included in all regressions include location dummies (U.S., Canada,
or Mexico); ownership dummies (U.S. or foreign-owned)13; a year trend and a dummy for
the pre-1998 period to control for the change in measurement of the dependent variable;
segment dummies ((sub-)compact cars, mid/full-size cars, sport/speciality cars, luxury
cars, SUVs, pickup trucks, minivans, and full-size vans)14; and scale, measured by the
logarithm of production capacity, calculated using a constant line rate and the regular
shift pattern followed during the year. Summary statistics for all variables are in Table 1.
⇒ [Table 1 approximately here] ⇐
Honda, on average, while it makes lower proﬁts per vehicle (compare tables on pages 30 and 150).
10A production line is deﬁned as the average number of body and assembly lines per plant.
11Under mass relief, all workers in the plant change shifts at the same time, while the assembly line is
stopped for 10–15 minutes. Under tag relief, individual workers relieve the worker on the previous shift
they are replacing.
12For U.S. plants the exact location is taken from the U.S. Environment Protection Agency’s web site
http://www.epa.gov/air/opar/auto/. For Canadian and Mexican plants, we use the center of the town
where plants are located.
13Joint venture plants are treated as foreign-owned.
14In the rare cases where vehicles from more than one segment are produced, the dummies are weighted
by production shares.
73 Three Trends in Automobile Production
3.1 Model Proliferation
The total number of car and light truck models for sale in North America increased from
185 in 1974 to 320 in 2004 (statistics in Table 2). In the U.S. the increase was even more
pronounced, from 133 to 282 models, a more than doubling of the number of products.
The median consumer, who replaces his vehicle every ﬁve years, had 25 models added to
his choice set with every purchase. Such an evolution is typical for a mature industry; to
retain market power ﬁrms diﬀerentiate their products.
⇒ [Table 2 approximately here] ⇐
Three more facts stand out from Table 2. First, the number of car models leveled
oﬀ around 1994, while light truck models are being added at an accelerated pace. This
is consistent with the relative maturity of the two segments; the use of light trucks as
passenger vehicles is relatively recent. The latest wave of ‘crossover’ vehicles, bridging the
gap between the two segments, keeps adding to the proliferation of models. Second, the
number of models is not the entire story. The average number of variations per model—
combinations of diﬀerent engines, transmissions, drivetrains, and body styles—also in-
creased over time, especially for light trucks. It adds to the manufacturing complexity.
In the analysis we will use chassis conﬁgurations and body styles as measures of variety.
Simply counting ‘names’ (models) risks double-counting vehicles that are merely rebadged
clones and/or omitting diﬀerent vehicles that are marketed under the same model-name.
Third, the number of models produced in North America has kept pace with the
number of models oﬀered for sale, while the number of assembly plants did not increase.
As a result, the average number of models produced in each plant necessarily increased.15
Total sales increased over time, but not to the same extent as the increase in models.
The average production run for models produced in North America decreased noticeably,
illustrated by the black line in Figure 1. This trend is most pronounced for cars (grey
solid line), for which the average production run almost halved from an average of 138,000
units in 1974–76 to 75,000 by the end of the period (2002–04). The dashed line illustrates
the declining sales per model (for the U.S.), which includes imported vehicles.
15The fraction of models produced domestically even increased slightly from 49% to 52%. Note that
the deﬁnition of an assembly plant diﬀers somewhat in the aggregate statistics, from Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook. In the plant-level sample used in the analysis, from The Harbour Report, some plants report
their car and light truck operations separately, even though they share the same production site.
8⇒ [Figure 1 approximately here] ⇐
Furthermore, looking at averages might be deceiving. Even though 174 cars and 90
light trucks were sold in the United States in 2002, the combined market shares of the
ten most popular vehicles were 32% and 42%, respectively. Total sales of 8.1 million
cars over 174 diﬀerent models averages 46,600 units per model, but the ten largest sellers
average 259,000 units, while the remaining 164 models sell on average only 33,600 apiece.
Manufacturers need to produce several of these models side-by-side in the same plant to
reach eﬃcient scale, which is traditionally put at approximately 200,000 vehicles per year.
The extent of model proliferation observed in the sample roughly matches the aggre-
gate evolution. Simply summing the models produced in all plants in the sample, the
ﬁrst two columns of Table 3, shows only a modest increase from 172 models in 1994 to
175 in 2004. However, a large number of models (43) were initially produced in more
than one plant, a practice that declined over time. Omitting double-counted models, last
two columns of Table 3, the sample statistics approach the aggregates in Table 2. The
remaining diﬀerences reﬂect that a few plants are missing from our sample.
Three other measures of product variety are also listed in Table 3: platforms, body
styles, and chassis conﬁgurations. While ﬁrms deﬁne a platform in slightly diﬀerent ways,
it can be understood as “a set of common product and manufacturing standards related
to a vehicle type. Ward’s AutoWorld (2001)”16 The deﬁnition of body styles should be
self-explanatory and chassis conﬁgurations indicate variations in drivetrain, i.e. engine,
transmission, and which wheels are driven. These measures are arguably more reliable
indicators of variety than models as they correspond directly to physical similarities or
diﬀerences between vehicles.
⇒ [Table 3 approximately here] ⇐
The number of platforms that vehicles are based on increased much less than any
of the other measures of variety. This reﬂects a deliberate strategy of manufacturers to
base several models on a single platform. Platform sharing makes it easier to produce
diﬀerent models on the same assembly line, discussed in detail in the next Section. In
1994, the simple sum of body styles equaled the number of models. On average, each
16Firms often use diﬀerent terminology. After its failed platform strategy in the 1980s General Motors
now prefers the term architecture, while Volkswagen stresses the sharing of modules and systems, as
opposed to common dimensions of the chassis or the frame.
9model was produced in a single body style in each assembly plant; omitting duplication,
each model was available in 1.10 styles. Variety in body styles was achieved by producing
models in more than one plant, the case for 31% of models. By 2004, the ratio of body
styles to models had increased to 1.29 (by plant) and 1.27 overall. The pattern for chassis
conﬁgurations is similar, but less pronounced; total conﬁgurations increased by 20% from
1994 to 2004 versus a 44% growth rate for body styles.
Finally, Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the average number of body styles and
chassis conﬁgurations produced in each plant, normalized by the 1994 value. We do not
discard duplicates because we want to capture variety at the plant-level (as opposed to
the industry-level). Both averages clearly increased, again more for styles (38%) than
for conﬁgurations (22%). The increase is broad-based, not driven by outliers. Only 10%
(24%) of plants produce less body styles (chassis conﬁgurations) in 2004 than in 1994.
This understates the increase as surviving plants already produced more variety in 1994.
The black line plots the sum of conﬁgurations and styles, which is our preferred measure
of variety. The average for the sample increased by 30% over the sample period; the
average increase for survivors (plants observed all eleven years) is 35%.
⇒ [Figure 2 approximately here] ⇐
A complication for our analysis is that ﬁrms could decide to increase variety primarily
in their best-performing plants, where they might expect a lower productivity penalty.
As new models are introduced to achieve product diﬀerentiation, decisions will depend on
choices of competing ﬁrms. We construct an instrument for plant-level variety exploiting
these competitive interactions and the fact that diﬀerent models produced in the same
plant tend to be very similar.17 If product introductions are endogenous, the average
variety of competing ﬁrms in each market segment will enter a ﬁrm’s decision of how
much variety to produce itself. At the same time, other ﬁrms’ variety will be independent
of the unobservable we are concerned about, a plant-speciﬁc productivity term. For each
plant-year we construct the average number of varieties produced by plants of other ﬁrms,
limited to models that compete in the same segment, as instrument for its own variety.18
The instrumenting strategy is similar to the use of characteristics of competitors’ vehicles
as an instrument for price in diﬀerentiated goods demand estimation, see for example
Berry et al. (1995).
17We discuss the practice of basing diﬀerent models on the same platform in the next Section.
18For plants that produce models in diﬀerent segments, we average the competitors’ variety over the
segments.
103.2 Flexible Technology
The model proliferation discussed so far has lead all ﬁrms to produce several models in
the same assembly plant. The oldest trick in the book, introduced by Alfred P. Sloan at
General Motors in the 1920s, is to sell mechanically similar cars under diﬀerent name-
plates. Models diﬀered mainly in appearance, standard features, and trim level and it
was straightforward to develop and assemble them together. All ﬁrms have mastered such
a ‘platform stretching’ strategy, even though they do not all use it to the same extent.
It allowed ﬁrms, as recent as the 1970s, to combine production of high volume vehicles
that share a platform in branch assembly plants across the country, see Rubenstein (1992)
for a history. These trends are consistent with the patterns in Table 3: the number of
platforms increased less than the number of models.
The more recent evolution of this practice is depicted in Figure 3A. We plot the cu-
bic time trend on the average number of models per platform across all North American
assembly plants for each the Big Three U.S. ﬁrms (including DaimlerChrysler), the com-
bined Japanese ﬁrms (Toyota, Nissan, and Honda), and the group of joint venture plants.19
Only the Japanese ﬁrms have noticeably stretched their platforms further over the sample
period. To some extent it is merely driven by the addition of models that always shared
the same global platform to their North American plants as they expanded capacity. The
joint venture plants, on the other hand, have sharply reduced platform stretching as ex-
perience taught them that rebadging Japanese vehicles under a U.S. brand was not very
proﬁtable.20 For the U.S. ﬁrms there is no real trend although the variation across ﬁrms
and plants is large, which we will be able to exploit in the analysis.
The pressure to diﬀerentiate vehicles further, reﬂected by the increasing numbers of
body styles and chassis conﬁgurations in Table 3, reduced the similarity between models
derived from the same platform and increased manufacturing complexity. General Motors
in North America and Volkswagen in Europe also ran into ﬁnancial problems as consumers
switched towards their cheaper brands (Chevrolet or Seat), given that those vehicles were
often mechanically similar to models oﬀered under premium brands (Buick or Audi). In
order to successfully market vehicles derived from the same platform, the models had to
19NUMMI is a joint venture between GM and Toyota; CAMI between GM and Suzuki; AutoAlliance
between Ford and Mazda; Diamond Star between Chrysler and Mitsubishi (sold to Mitsubishi when
Chrysler faced ﬁnancial diﬃculties); and Subaru-Isuzu is an all-Japanese joint venture.
20The Geo Metro, Geo Prizm, Ford Probe, nor Eagle Talon could come close to the sales success of
their Japanese siblings, the Suzuki Swift, Toyota Corolla, Mazda MX6, and Mitsubishi Eclipse, to name
only a few examples.
11be suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. Moreover, the emergence of new segments and the growing
importance of light trucks reduced the possibility to base models on the same platform.
⇒ [Figure 3 approximately here] ⇐
When a plant is forced to produce radically diﬀerent models, it can do so by adding
assembly lines to a plant. Approximately one out of six observations in the sample has
more than one assembly line, more than one in ﬁve in 1997 and 1998. Alternatively,
manufacturers started to assemble models derived from diﬀerent platforms on the same
production line. This is how we will deﬁne ﬂexible technology.21 Figure 3B plots the trend
in the number of platforms per line for the same ﬁve (groups of) ﬁrms. In three cases there
is a strong upward trend in ﬂexibility. GM and especially the Japanese ﬁrms and joint
ventures produced more platforms per line in 2004 than in 1994. In sharp contrast with
the tendency for platform stretching in Figure 3A, line sharing shows divergent trends for
diﬀerent ﬁrms. Both Ford and DaimlerChrysler had hardly adopted the practice in 2004.
The fraction of plants producing more than one platform per line ranges from a low of
4% in 1996 to a high of 24% in 2004.
It should be stressed that the end goal is to produce a greater variety of vehicles per
assembly line in an eﬃcient way and ﬂexible technology is merely a means to that end.
Being able to produce models from diﬀerent platform on the same line is certainly an
advantage, but the ability to stretch the platform, e.g. deriving radically diﬀerent vehicles
from it, would preempt the need for ﬂexibility, deﬁned this way. The opposite evolution
of the joint ventures in Figures 3A and 3B is consistent with this. The two measures
of ﬂexibility tend to be negatively correlated for all plants. Only the Japanese ﬁrms
are exploiting both dimensions of ﬂexibility (in diﬀerent plants). In the analysis we use
platforms per line as measure of ﬂexibility, but we control for models per platform.
Flexibility also changes over time. For example, Honda assembled the Civic (compact
car) and Acura CL (luxury car) on the same line in its East Liberty, OH plant (1996–
1999), but only until a new line was installed at its Alliston, ON plant. Currently, each
of its four North American plants is able to produce nearly every model in its lineup
with only minor tooling changes, even though the company rarely uses this ﬂexibility,
Automotive News (2002). This underscores a crucial aspect of our application. Even if
a plant has the capability for ﬂexible production, it will not necessarily exploit it every
21Widely advertised examples of models derived from diﬀerent platforms that are assembled on the
same line are the Honda Civic and Accord in East Liberty, OH, the Chrysler Caravan minivan and
Paciﬁca SUV in Windsor, Canada and the BMW Z4 roadster and X5 SUV in Spartanburg, SC.
12year and it might not show up in our data set. If complementarities are inferred from the
clustering of adoption decisions, one has to somehow distinguish between acquiring and
exploiting the capability. If we identify complementarities directly from the joint eﬀects
on productivity, this distinction is not a problem.
Instruments for ﬂexibility are the inside area of the plant and the way shift relief is
organized. Both are assumed to be pre-determined. Most plants are several decades old
and their size was determined long before the capital equipment was installed or work
practices determined. Size is important as only larger plants have the option to duplicate
assembly lines, an alternative approach to producing more variety. The method of shift
relief, tag or mass, is determined at the plant-level through negotiations with the labor
union. Controlling for ownership, shift relief is unlikely to be correlated with unobserved
plant-level productivity, but as it reﬂects how labor and management have chosen to
interact they are likely to inﬂuence the adoption of ﬂexibility. The production complexity
under ﬂexible technology requires more autonomy and problem solving skills of employees.
The presence of tag relief, whereby individual workers relieve each other, signals the level
of trust between workers and supervisors.
3.3 In/Outsourcing
Another aspect of ﬁrm organization that has received a lot of attention recently is the
make-or-buy decision. Outsourcing, especially to low-cost overseas destinations, is the
most recent buzz word in the business press. A major diﬃculty to study this phenomenon
is a lack of data, as outsourcing decisions are considered highly conﬁdential. One exception
is Novak and Stern (2003) who use detailed information on nineteen automobile model-
years, but cannot reveal the identities of the ﬁrms involved.
Oﬃcial statistics, aggregated up from plant-level information, can be used to track one
measure of outsourcing: the share of materials (the sum of raw materials, intermediate
inputs, and purchased business services) in ﬁnal sales. The most detailed industry clas-
siﬁcation with comparable information for the three North American countries is “Motor
Vehicles” (SIC 371). The ratio trended up until the late 1980s and declined subsequently,
see Figure 4. At the very end of the period the materials-sales ratio increased again, but
in 2001 the ratio in Canada and the U.S. was the same as in 1972. For the sub-sector
“Motor Vehicles and Passenger Car Bodies” (SIC 3711), data from the U.S. Bureau of
the Census reveals the same pattern of increase and decline, but changes are magniﬁed
(dotted black line).
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The absence of a clear time trend is not entirely surprising. The range of materials and
components each assembly plant receives from other plants is relatively similar. Much of
the changes in sourcing are likely to happen at the ﬁrm instead of the plant-level. The
measure in Figure 4 does not distinguish between outsourcing to other plants owned by
the same ﬁrm or to independent suppliers. Aggregate industry statistics for the U.S.
do indicate a growing importance of the “Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories”(SIC 3714)
sub-sector, with sales growth of 9% per year over the last 15 years, compared to only 3%
growth for SIC 3711. Unfortunately, no information is available at the ﬁrm-level.
The plant-level data from Harbour contains information on another aspect of the out-
sourcing decision: plants report which of 29 tasks they perform on-site. While distinct
from the more commonly studied make-or-buy decision of components, this provides infor-
mation on a dimension where assembly plants are likely to vary more.22 At one extreme,
the Oshawa GM plant performed none of the tasks on the list in-house in 1994, while the
Georgetown Toyota plant performed all but two tasks on-site prior to 1996. The average
fraction of tasks outsourced is 64% and the standard deviation is 17%. The index in
Table 1 refers to insourcing, deﬁned as one minus the fraction of outsourced activities, to
facilitate the interpretation of coeﬃcient estimates later on.
Over time, outsourcing is relatively constant, see the ﬁrst column in Table 4. In
1994, 36% of all activities were performed in-house and in 2004 the fraction was 35.6%,
after a temporary increase to a maximum of 38.5% in 1998. The pattern is virtually
identical for the entire sample or the balanced sample of plants that survived from 1994
to 2004, which excludes several foreign transplants that enter after 1994. Compositional
eﬀects—transplants tend to perform more activities in-house initially before they establish
relationships with local suppliers—seem to be minor. Similarly as for ﬂexibility, the
average hides important cross-sectional variation. For example, Van Biesebroeck (2006)
shows that there are large diﬀerences by ownership.
The set of tasks can be split into a ﬁrst group of administrative and manufacturing
tasks which are usually outsourced and a group of assembly tasks that are more likely to
be performed in-house. Harbour adjusts the hpv statistics for tasks in the ﬁrst (but not
the second) group that are insourced. Statistics in the second and third column indicate
that even though the average level diﬀers markedly for the two groups, there is no real
22As with the aggregate statistics, we cannot distinguish between outsourcing to independent suppliers
or to other divisions of the same ﬁrm.
14time trend for either.
Using the detailed responses for individual tasks, we can look at changes in outsourcing
more directly. In columns 5 to 7 we indicate how many plants brought one or more tasks
in-house, newly outsourced a task, or did not change any of their outsourcing choices.
While no change is the dominant choice in all years, in seven of the ten years plants that
increased insourcing outnumber plants that increased outsourcing.23 In columns 8 to 10
we sum all the changes, in or out, over plants. For example, in 1995 sixteen plants newly
insourced a total of twenty three tasks, while thirteen plants newly outsourced a total of
ﬁfteen tasks. The net eﬀect of tasks performed in-house was an increase by eight. In most
years the net change is positive and the cumulative change over the entire period and all
plants is for an average of 3.5 tasks per year to be moved in-house. Outsourcing decisions
were changed more often in the earlier period. In 1997, eighty changes are made and
insourcing is twice as common as outsourcing. In 1998, one hundred changes are made
and insourcing is 50% more likely.
⇒ [Table 4 approximately here] ⇐
Of the three activities considered, simultaneity between unobserved productivity and
outsourcing is most likely. Firms are expected to perform less activities in-house if they
know a plant is particularly unproductive. Instruments for outsourcing are the distances
from each plant to the center of the industry, calculated by year both for the entire North
American industry and by country.24 Plants located farther from the center will ﬁnd it
harder or simply more costly to ﬁnd suppliers. After controlling for the country (which
will also soak up ﬁxed border eﬀects) and ownership, there is no reason to believe distance
is correlated with unobserved productivity. The location of older plants in the sample is
predetermined relative to the current outsourcing decision—several sites predate World
War II—while the location of newer plants is generally considered to be mostly determined
by shipping costs for the ﬁnal vehicle and labor market conditions.25 While both distances
are negatively related to outsourcing, the distance to the country-speciﬁc center proved
to be the strongest predictor.
23The ﬁrst two categories are not exclusive.
24The center for North America is (on average) 62 miles south-west of the Lousville, KY Ford plant.
The U.S. center is approximately 43 miles south-east of the Subaru-Isuzu plant in Lafayette, IN. From
1994 to 2000, it moved almost 30 miles south. The Canadian center is closest to the Cambridge Toyota
plant, but distances never go beyond 340 miles; the Mexican center is closest to Silao, Guanojuato. An
attempt was made to control for travel-time, but given that most distances are large and plants are always
adjacent to highways, diﬀerences were minor and coeﬃcient estimates were identical.
25Shipping ﬁnished vehicles is considerably more expensive than components, see Rubenstein (1992).
154 Model
Complementarities
Complementarities are deﬁned as the joint impact of activities on some return function,
productivity in our case. To ﬁx ideas consider the following simple model. Total labor
hours required to assemble a vehicle can be divided into the direct labor input on each
vehicle and externalities on other types of vehicles produced in the same plant, which can











i and j index the N varieties assembled in the same plant. The marginal labor requirement
for each extra vehicle is a hours and additionally it increases (or decreases) the labor
requirements on all vehicles of a diﬀerent type by b.
Both the direct eﬀect and the spillovers depend on other characteristics of the plant:
a = a(Flexibility,Insourcing,Scale,Other controls)
b = b(Flexibility,Insourcing,Other?).
















Flexibility makes the entire production process more complicated and will, ceteris paribus,
lead to higher direct labor requirements. The beneﬁt will be to lower labor requirements
of other varieties produced in the same plant—captured by the negative derivative of
the b function. Doing more tasks in-house will straightforwardly increase labor require-
ments, but it can generate useful expertise which reduces the spillovers on other types of
vehicles, possibly even reducing their labor requirements.27 Through the a function, we
26It would be straightforward to extend the model to allow for discrete adoption of activities. This
would require the necessary assumptions for the productivity function to be supermodular in the diﬀerent
activities, as in Athey and Stern (2003) and Miravete and Pern´ ıas (2005). Given that the model only
serves an illustrative purpose, it is limited to the continuous case and we can deﬁne complementarity
simply in terms of cross-partial derivatives, as in Arora and Gambardella (1990).
27One mechanism would be ﬁxed costs to outsourcing relationships that are task and vehicle-type
speciﬁc (e.g. managing deliveries), while the ﬁxed costs to perform an in-house task could be not or to a
16control explicitly for scale economies (assumed to be positive) and other eﬀects. Other
factors, maybe scale, could aﬀect spillovers, but we do not have a strong prior on the
direction of those eﬀects. Finally, producing diﬀerent varieties in the same plant gener-
ates on average positive spillovers, i.e. it increases labor requirements for other vehicles:
b(Flexibility,Insourcing) ≥ 0.28
Rewriting equation (1) as
Hours
Q
= (a − b) + b N,
using ‘Variety’ for N, and substituting linear speciﬁcations for the a and b functions,29
we obtain
hpv = αV Variety + αF Flexibility + αI Insourcing (4)
+
h
βV F Flexibility + βV I Insourcing
i
× Variety
+ αFI Flexibility × Insourcing + αS Scale + Other controls.
The dependent variable, hours per vehicle, is the inverse of labor productivity. The α
coeﬃcients capture direct eﬀects. Flexible production, insourcing of tasks, and producing
a large variety are all expected to be associated with productivity penalties, i.e. have a
positive impact on hpv (αV, αF, αI ≥ 0). Scale economies in automobile production are
expected to be positive (αS ≤ 0). The β coeﬃcients capture the reduction in produc-
tivity penalty associated with variety if ﬂexibility or insourcing is increased. The main
prediction we want to test is that both activities generate negative eﬀects (βV F, βV I ≤ 0).
Finally, both activities could be complementary themselves, if the cross-partial derivative
is negative (αFI ≤ 0).
Estimation
We now describe how complementarities can be identiﬁed in the presence of unobservables.











2βjk Yk + ξj
i
× Yj + Controls +  . (5)
lesser extent type speciﬁc (e.g. training workers).
28If adoption of activities is discrete, we assume that b(0,0) ≥ 0.
29We assume that the direct eﬀects dominate spillovers, such that sign(∂a/∂X) = sign(∂(a−b)/∂X).
30Eq.(5) is similar to the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ function on p. 368 in Arora and Gambardella (1990); the objective
function on p. 16 in Novak and Stern (2003); or the proﬁt function (7) in Miravete and Pern´ ıas (2005).
17Each activity j ∈ {V,F,I} has a direct eﬀect on productivity (αj), but the total eﬀect
will diﬀer if other activities k are adopted jointly (βjk). For example, producing a larger
variety is expected to reduce productivity (αV > 0), but this reduction might be mitigated
by adopting complementary activities like ﬂexible technology (βV F < 0) or insourcing of
tasks (βV I < 0). Part of the return to each activity is assumed to be unobservable (ξj) and
these returns could be correlated across activities. A set of exogenous control variables
and an i.i.d. error term complete the estimation equation.
We are primarily interested in identifying the complementary eﬀect of diﬀerent activ-
ities, the β coeﬃcients. It is by now widely understood that estimating equation (5) by
least squares will produce biased estimates if ﬁrms make endogenous adoption decisions,
see Arora (1996) or Athey and Stern (2003). If the unobservable return to each activity
is correlated, for example because they all depend on an omitted variable like managerial
ability, the activities will look like complements even if they do not inﬂuence each other’s
return. This will happen when one studies the adoption decisions directly or looks at the
joint impact on productivity.
Assuming all activities are continuous, a ﬁrm will choose the level of Yj by equating the
marginal cost associated with Yj—part of which is the impact on productivity (multiplied





+ MC(Yj) = MB(Yj).
For simplicity, we assume marginal costs and beneﬁts are linear in Yj and Xj, an exogenous













j Xj + ηj. (6)
In matrix form, the system of ﬁrst order conditions for all activities is
B Y
∗ = Γ
0 + ΓX + ξ + η,
where Y = [YV,YF,YI]0, and similarly for all other vectors. The Γ0 vector groups the








18The B matrix has −γ
y
j on its diagonals and βij (i 6= j) oﬀ-diagonal elements. Unless
complementarities are entirely absent, the optimal level of each of the activities will depend
on each of the three unobservable returns in the ξ vector.
Two straightforward estimation procedures are possible. We can estimate equation
(6) for activity j using the excluded beneﬁt or cost shifters for the other activities k as
instruments for Yk. Novak and Stern (2003) follow this approach to estimate comple-
mentary eﬀects of outsourcing decisions on diﬀerent components of a car. Note that it is
crucial to use activity-speciﬁc instruments, as all exogenous variables that inﬂuence the
choice of activity j are included in the equation.
Alternatively, we can estimate the return function (5) directly, instrumenting the
endogenous Y variables with the exogenous cost and beneﬁt shifters. Given that the co-
eﬃcients enter linearly, a two-step approach works: ﬁrst estimate the system of reduced
form equations (7) and replace the endogenous variables in (5) with their predicted val-
ues (ˆ Y ). Alternatively, we can estimate the productivity equation using instrumental
variables, using interactions of the exogenous variables as additional instruments. The
advantage of this latter approach is that we can use a GMM estimator to gain eﬃciency
and test for overidentifying restrictions.
The empirical strategy of estimating the return function instead of the ﬁrst order
conditions has a number of advantages. First, it is robust to spurious correlation in
adoption costs. Second and particularly important for our application, the level of some
activities is harder to change than for other. For example, tasks brought in-house when
variety was high, can take some time to outsource when variety falls. While the ﬁrst
order conditions for some activities might sometimes be slack, this should not change the
productivity eﬀects. Third, the only way to identify the direct eﬀects, the α coeﬃcients,
is from the return function. While these are often of lesser interest, in our application
complementarities are expected to be of an unusual form: direct eﬀects of activities on
productivity are negative, but interaction eﬀects positive. To ﬁnd evidence for this, we
have to estimate the productivity equation directly.
Athey and Stern (2003) investigate explicitly under what assumptions activity-speciﬁc
instruments will be able to identify complementarities. For example, one has to rule out
unobservables that aﬀect the joint return of adoption of diﬀerent activities—this would
be βjk = β0
jk + ξjk in equation (5). To some extent this is merely deﬁnitional, all joint
eﬀects of activities could be called complementarities. The rigorous framework in Athey
and Stern (2003) distinguishes between joint returns that result from unobservables and
true complementarities that accrue even in the case of an exogenous shift in adoption.
195 Results
Productivity regressions
The dependent variable in all regressions is hours per vehicle (hpv), the inverse of labor
productivity. The crucial stylized fact—a productivity penalty for producing variety—is
documented in Table 5 using a number of diﬀerent measures for variety: platforms, models,
body styles, chassis conﬁgurations and the sum and product of styles and conﬁgurations.
All coeﬃcient estimates are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating lower
productivity if higher variety is produced. As expected, producing more platforms is
especially costly. The relative magnitudes seem reasonable and are similar to the extent
to which varieties share the same production line. The preferred measure, ‘styles +
conﬁgurations’, leads to only a moderate productivity penalty: 21 minutes per vehicle for
each extra unit of variety.
In each of the subsequent regressions we use the same controls as in Table 5. Pro-
ductivity growth is positive. The negative sign on the pre-1998 dummy indicates that
productivity growth is slowing down. The dummy is included primarily to capture the
change in the dependent variable, but it is rarely signiﬁcant. The negative coeﬃcient on
capacity indicates increasing returns to scale. Productivity is slightly higher in Canada
than in the U.S. (the excluded category), requiring on average 1.5 fewer hours per vehicle,
while the lower productivity in Mexico is more pronounced. Foreign-owned plants, which
includes joint ventures, are more productive. Once we instrument for activities, see be-
low, the point estimate on the foreign dummy is estimated very imprecisely.31 Models in
diﬀerent market segment diﬀer substantially in their labor input requirement, with luxury
cars and (mini)vans being most labor intensive (the excluded category is compact cars).
⇒ [Table 5 approximately here] ⇐
The negative coeﬃcient estimates on the time trend indicates substantial productivity
growth, the time to assemble a vehicle falls by 15 to 45 minutes per year. In addition to
the linear eﬀects of variety and time, each regression also contains the interaction of the
two variables. The productivity penalty associated with variety is falling for each of the
measures. Possibly this trend is explained by the adoption of activities that make it more
economical to produce variety, such as ﬂexible technology and insourcing of tasks so they
can be shared between models. This is the focus in the remainder of the analysis.
31Once Mexican plants are dropped or activities are measured discretely, the coeﬃcient becomes sig-
niﬁcant again and is indistinguishable from the OLS estimate.
20The ﬁrst column in Table 6 contains the least squares estimate of equation (4). For
this and all following regressions, the coeﬃcient estimates on the control variables are re-
ported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. All coeﬃcients have the expected sign. The linear
coeﬃcients on variety, ﬂexibility, and insourcing are estimated positively and coeﬃcients
on all interactions are negative. Increasing the use of ﬂexible technology reduces produc-
tivity directly, the linear “Flexibility” term is positive, but makes it less costly to add
variety.32 Similarly, bringing activities in-house requires more hours to produce a vehicle,
ceteris paribus, but the increase in hours for added variety is reduced (although the point
estimate is not signiﬁcant). The two activities reinforce each other. Increasing ﬂexibility
lowers the productivity cost of insourcing, and vice versa. The increased complexity when
diﬀerent platforms are assembled on the same line seems to reduce the number of hours
that can be saved by outsourcing.
As discussed before, one cannot take these results as evidence for complementarities in
production as they can merely reﬂect correlated unobservables in the adoption decisions.
In the other columns of Table 6 we explore how sensitive the results are to alternative
exogeneity assumptions. The implicit assumption in column (1) is that all activities are
exogenous. In columns (2) to (4), we instrument for ﬂexibility, for outsourcing, and for
both. In column (5) all activities, including variety, are treated as endogenous. Instru-
ments were discussed in detail in the respective Sections (3.1–3.3): for ﬂexibility we use
plant size and type of shift relief, for insourcing distance to the industry center in North
America and within the country, and for variety we use variety in competing plants.
Tests for validity of the instruments are reported below the coeﬃcients. The marginal
explanatory power of the instruments in the diﬀerent ﬁrst stage regressions varies some-
what across variables and speciﬁcations, but the p-value is never above 5%.33 For each
endogenous variable (or product of endogenous variables) we can reject that the instru-
ments have no explanatory power. Overidentiﬁcation restrictions can never be rejected
either, which to some extent merely reﬂects the imprecision of some coeﬃcient estimates.
When instrumenting, the absolute values of the point estimates and the standard
errors tend to increase, but all signs are unchanged. The interactions make it impossible
to predict the bias one would expect using least squares if adoption is endogenous. We
take heart that in every single equation the signs of all coeﬃcients correspond to our
32A dummy to control for the practice of basing several models (more than two) on a platform is
included (reported in Table A.1.), as platform stretching is an alternative to ﬂexibility as we deﬁned it.
33To improve precision the coeﬃcients are estimated by GMM and not by the two-step approach that
underlies the test.
21expectations and that the interactions between variety and both activities are signiﬁcantly
negative in columns (4) and (5) where we instrument for both ﬂexibility and insourcing.
At the bottom of Table 6 we report the results of Hausman speciﬁcation tests for
each model versus the models in columns (4) and (5). The test statistic in column (4)
suggests that one cannot reject that variety is exogenous, as the p-value is greater than
0.99. Comparing the two columns in Table 6 with those in Table A.1 suggests that changes
tend to be much smaller for the control variables. Limiting the test to the six variables
of interest, the three activities and their interactions, the test statistic is only slightly
reduced and the p-value is still 0.92. Hence, we will treat variety as exogenous in the
subsequent regressions, consistent with the general view within the industry, as discussed
in the introduction. Similar speciﬁcation tests, against columns (4) or (5), for endogeneity
of ﬂexibility or insourcing or both, ﬁnd stronger but no overwhelming evidence that these
activities are endogenous. Erring on the conservative side, we will continue to instrument
for these activities.
Comparing the preferred results in column (4) with the OLS estimates, we ﬁnd that
the direct negative eﬀect of both activities on productivity has increased. To the ex-
tent that activities are chosen endogenously, ﬁrms are successfully implementing them in
plants that do not suﬀer as large a (direct) productivity penalty from the activities. The
same mechanism is consistent with a reduction in the absolute value of the coeﬃcient on
the variety*ﬂexibility interaction when we instrument for insourcing (or additionally for
variety in column (5)). Only exploiting the exogenous variation in the insourcing decision,
as captured by distance, lowers the estimated complementarity between insourcing and
variety.
The interactions with ﬂexibility, on the other hand, become larger and highly signif-
icant when we instrument. Results now suggest that as ﬂexibility is introduced because
of space constraints and not because the plant is expected to master it well, the direct
productivity penalty is greater (as expected), but the complementary eﬀect to reduce
the productivity penalty for variety is enhanced (contrary to expectation). If variety is
exogenous but positively correlated with ﬂexibility, the underestimate of the direct eﬀect
of ﬂexibility in (1) could lead to an upward bias for the interaction between ﬂexibility
and variety. If variety is chosen endogenously, the apparent complementarity between
variety and ﬂexibility in (4) merely picks up the decision to add variety to a plant that
is expected to handle it well. The reduction in the interaction coeﬃcient from (4) to (5)
would be consistent with this.
22⇒ [Table 6 approximately here] ⇐
So far we have treated all observations as independent, without exploiting the panel
structure of the data set. Given that unobserved heterogeneity is a concern when trying
to identify complementarities, we would ideally estimate the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
The problem is that the instruments hardly vary over time. Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences leads
to extremely imprecise coeﬃcient estimates for most variables. Moreover, the theoretical
model in Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000) illustrates that joint adoption is not a require-
ment for complementarities. Estimating the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences would identify
complementarities solely from the joint eﬀects at the time of adoption. If one wanted to
adopt such an identiﬁcation strategy, it would be more straightforward to estimate the
ﬁrst order conditions for optimal activity choice directly, see below.
As an alternative, we include plant-ﬁxed eﬀects in the model and estimate as before.
This way we remove the time-invariant component of productivity from the analysis. We
also estimate the model with ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, as capabilities that enter the adoption
decisions are likely to be shared between plants owned by the same ﬁrm. While there are
92 plants in the sample, they are owned by only 11 ﬁrms, conserving degrees of freedom.
Finally, we also estimate the model using random eﬀects, allowing the error terms to be
correlated across plants.
Surprisingly, not a single coeﬃcient estimate changes sign. While estimation precision
is reduced, the variety*insourcing interaction remains signiﬁcant at the 5% or 10% level
in each speciﬁcation and the variety*ﬂexibility interaction is only insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero when random eﬀects are included. The direct coeﬃcient estimates are also
similar, which is especially surprisingly in column (8), where they are entirely identiﬁed
from the variation over time. The estimated productivity penalty for variety is 5.5 with
plant-ﬁxed eﬀects, only slightly above the penalty of 4.9 estimated earlier. This modest
increase is consistent with the assumption that plant-level variety is mostly exogenous.
Otherwise, the change in the coeﬃcient estimate would likely be larger using cross-time
instead of cross-plant variation. In contrast, identifying insourcing mostly from variation
over time increases the point estimate considerably.
We include the tests for validity of the instruments at the bottom. While we had
expected the instruments not to have much explanatory power in the ﬁrst stage, especially
when plant-ﬁxed eﬀects are included, this does not turn out to be the case. Every single
endogenous variable (or interaction of endogenous variables) is well predicted by the
instruments.
23The results in Table 7 suggest that it is highly unlikely that the complementarities
identiﬁed earlier are just picking up unobserved heterogeneity. At the same time, the
relative size of the eﬀects change. In column (4), the primary eﬀect of insourcing is to
lower the direct cost of ﬂexibility. In the other columns, the eﬀect of insourcing on the
productivity penalty for variety is enhanced, at the expense of the variety*ﬂexibility term,
and most of the insourcing*ﬂexibility interaction eﬀect disappears. While the results
still indicate that both activities lower the productivity penalty for variety, potential
complementarities between the two activities makes it hard to determine their relative
importance.
Measuring the activities continuously facilitates the theory, but makes it harder to
interpret the coeﬃcient estimates. For example, the productivity impact of the ﬂexible
technology depends on the number of varieties produced and on the extent of outsourcing.
To illustrate the impact of ﬂexibility and insourcing on the cost of producing variety, the
predicted hpv as a function of variety is plotted in Figures A.1a and A.1b in the Appendix
using coeﬃcient estimates from columns (1) and (4). While the coeﬃcient estimates are
too imprecise to use them to make predictions, we include these ﬁgures to illustrate the
economic signiﬁcance of the estimates. In addition, the ﬁgures also indicate that large
changes in point estimates do not necessarily translate in large hpv diﬀerences as opposing
changes on direct and interaction eﬀects will partially oﬀset one another.
Evaluating all variables at their sample mean (solid black line), hpv is predicted to
rise more quickly with variety using the GMM estimates (bottom panel) than using the
OLS estimates (top panel). If a plant produces with average ﬂexibility but insources 67%
of activities instead of the average of 36%, adding variety tends to lower the predicted
hours (grey short-dashed line). This level of insourcing corresponds to the 90th percentile.
Evaluating hpv at the 90th percentile of ﬂexibility (1.5 platforms per line) and the mean
level of outsourcing (grey long-dashed lines) has similar eﬀects. The higher direct ef-
fects for the GMM estimates shift the curves upward farther, while the more negative
variety*ﬂexibility interaction is also noticeable. Finally, the joint eﬀect of adopting both
activities eliminates most of the productivity penalty for variety, the white lines become
almost ﬂat, but especially under the GMM results this would be proﬁtable only for very
high levels of variety (the 90th percentile is 10 styles + conﬁgurations).
Robustness checks
In Table 8, we present a number of robustness checks using the same estimation method
as in column (4) of Table 6, which is repeated for convenience. Given that the dependent
24variable is always positive, we can estimate the productivity regression in logarithms.34
Results in column (9) indicate that direct eﬀects are still positive and interaction eﬀects
negative, with little change in the precision of the estimates. Evaluated at the sample
mean, adding one extra variety to the plant increases labor requirements by 5%. In-
creasing both ﬂexibility and insourcing by one standard deviation, would eliminate the
productivity penalty almost entirely. In this case, the coeﬃcient on scale, 1.269, has a
direct interpretation. This level of scale economies is consistent with Friedlaender et al.
(1983) who ﬁnd 1.23 for the most recent year in their sample (1979) using multifactor
productivity. Hence, the assumption that capital stock diﬀerences between plants are
relatively unimportant seems not unreasonable.
As mentioned earlier, the calculation of the dependent variable diﬀered pre-1998 and
we used two overlapping years to construct a conversion factor. A dummy variable was
included to soak up remaining diﬀerences, but it is rarely signiﬁcant. To control for the
change in a more ﬂexible way, we re-estimate the model dropping all observations prior
to 1998, results are in column (10). The only noticeable change is that the direct eﬀect
of outsourcing becomes much smaller and insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcients of interest, the
interaction coeﬃcients of variety with insourcing and ﬂexibility, are virtually unchanged
and still signiﬁcantly negative.
In spite of our motivation for the use of the hpv variable, one might be concerned
that it incorporates diﬀerences between plants in capital intensity or diﬀerences in the
degree of component outsourcing (as opposed to ‘tasks’, for which we control explicitly).
Diﬀerences are likely to be largest between Mexican and other plants because of wage
diﬀerences. Omitting the Mexican plants from the sample, results in column (11), changes
several point estimates, but all the qualitative ﬁndings go through. The largest change
is for the three coeﬃcients related to insourcing. Dropping the Mexican plants removes
much of the time variation from the instruments for variety (distances to the industry
center) and makes both instruments much more alike. The estimates related to ﬂexible
technology, which could be a more capital intensive way of operating, change much less.
Instead of measuring ﬂexibility and insourcing as continuous variables, one can also
measure them discretely: adopt or don’t adopt. For ﬂexibility, we deﬁne an adoption
dummy that switches from zero to one if more than one platform is produced per line.
For insourcing, we deﬁne a dummy indicating whether a plant performs more activities
in-house than the median plant in that year. Variety is still measured continuously as
34Eq.(1) could be speciﬁed with multiplicative spillover eﬀects on the labor requirements of other models.
25the sum of body styles and chassis conﬁgurations. While the coeﬃcient estimates in
columns (12) are not comparable to other columns, the absolute magnitudes indicate
very large reductions in the productivity penalty when the activities are adopted. Under
the restrictive functional form we use, hpv even goes down with increased variety, for
ﬂexible plants or those that insource most. Still, the very high direct eﬀects of both
activities makes adopting only proﬁtable for plants that produce most varieties.35
Finally, results in column (13) add scale interacted with variety to the model. In each
regression we included a direct eﬀect of scale (estimated negatively and highly signiﬁcant),
we now allow scale to inﬂuence spillovers as well. I.e. scale could be one of the ‘other’
factors in the b function in equation (1). We ﬁnd that indirect eﬀects of scale hardly
matter at all. The other coeﬃcient estimates are virtually unchanged, standard errors
are very similar, and the coeﬃcient on the variety*scale interaction term is small and
insigniﬁcant.
⇒ [Table 8 approximately here] ⇐
Optimal activity choices
Finally, we estimate the ﬁrst order conditions for the three activities, equation (6), directly.
We follow the approach in Novak and Stern (2003) using the cost or beneﬁt shifters for
activities k as instruments for Yk in the equation for Y ∗
j . The main disadvantage of this
identiﬁcation approach, relative to estimating the return function directly, is that all ﬁrst
order conditions have to hold with equality all the time for the relationship to be stable.
If one activity is more easily changed than another, e.g. because of diﬀerences in sunk
or ﬁxed costs, the equation will be misspeciﬁed. As mentioned earlier, we also cannot
identify the direct eﬀects this way, but we can test for complementarities.
Results in Table 9 show that the main prediction of the analysis is conﬁrmed. Va-
riety enters with a positive sign in the equations describing the ﬂexible technology and
insourcing choice. Variety at competing plants is used as instrument for own variety in
both equations. Results in column (1), show that variety at competing plants is a very
strong predictor of own variety. The eﬀects of ﬂexibility and insourcing on each other
and for insourcing on variety choice are insigniﬁcant. In contrast with most of our earlier
ﬁndings, they enter each other’s equation with a negative coeﬃcient.
35With discrete activities, the model is now in the same form as that discussed in Athey and Stern
(2003). In our estimating equation, their test statistic for complementarities between insourcing and
ﬂexibility would be measured directly by the βFI coeﬃcient. The large and signiﬁcantly negative estimate
suggests the presence of complementarities.
26⇒ [Table 9 approximately here] ⇐
6 Concluding remarks
On November 21, 2005 GM announced that it would eliminate a total of 30,000 jobs
across North America by 2008 and the next February it announced a 2005 loss of $8.6b,
the second-highest in its history. In between, GM introduced a slate of new vehicles at the
Detroit Autoshow, raising the number of models it will sell in 2006 in the U.S. alone to
72. Ford’s restructuring plan called for 25,000 layoﬀs, but stressed the large investments
in ﬂexibility that are underway. Its Oakville assembly plant will receive a $1b investment
to make it fully ﬂexible, following similar investments in its Kansas City plant and a
new truck plant in its home town, Dearborn. Meanwhile, Toyota continues to prosper in
North America. On average, it adds one model per year to its North American production
lineup, it performs more tasks within its assembly plants than any other ﬁrm, and it has
mastered ﬂexibility, which shows up most clearly in its capacity utilization, averaging 99%
over the last ﬁve years (the industry average was 85%).
While these are merely some examples of the interplay between model proliferation,
ﬂexible technology and outsourcing, the analysis has documented more systematically
that the three activities are complementary in the production of automobiles. In particu-
lar, ﬂexibility and insourcing can lower the productivity penalty associated with increased
variety. Plants that are able to assemble vehicles derived from diﬀerent platforms on the
same production line face a lower productivity penalty when they increase variety. Simi-
larly, plants that outsource less activities face a diminished productivity cost to increasing
variety. Some results suggest that ﬂexible technology and insourcing are themselves com-
plements and that their cost of adoption, in terms of lost productivity, is reduced when
they are adopted together. The crucial interaction coeﬃcients are not always estimated
very precisely and the point estimates cover a wide range, but the eﬀects are extremely
consistent across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
The nature of these complementarities diﬀers from previous results. These activities
do not increase productivity in their own right with an extra boost for joint adoption.
Rather, increasing one activity tends to decrease productivity, but this reduction is dimin-
ished if other activities are increased as well. In particular, while ﬂexibility and performing
more tasks in-house increases direct labor requirements, they reduce the marginal labor
requirement associated with increases in variety. Even absent heterogeneity in unobserv-
27able returns or costs, implementing these activities will be worthwhile for some plants,
but not for all.
On the methodological side, we are the ﬁrst study to ﬁnd complementarities in a frame-
work that studies the joint impact on a performance variable using the activity-speciﬁc
instrumenting approach advocated in Athey and Stern (2003). The main advantages over
studies that look at clustering in adoption decisions is that we also recover the direct
eﬀects on productivity and that the model is robust to learning and sunk or ﬁxed costs
of adoption. A major disadvantage is that instrumenting for interactions of endogenous
variables results in less stable point estimates.
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Note: Average variety across all plants, where variety is defined as body styles, chassis configurations, 
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Figure 2: Model variety produced per plant has increased over time (1994=1)Source: Own calculations based on plant-level data from The Harbour Report (various years)
Note: Cubic time trend on the models per platform (top panel) or platforms per production line (bottom 
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Figure 4: Outsourcing trends in North America 





























U.S.A. (OECD data) CANADA (OECD data)
U.S.A. (census data) MEXICO (OECD data)
Note: Materials-sales ratio for the "Motor vehicles" industry (SIC 371) based on 
statistics from the OECD STAN database (solid lines) and for the subsector "Motor 
vehicles and passenger car bodies" (SIC 3711) using data from the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census (dashed line).32



















































Note: Own calculations based on coefficient estimates from column (1) in Table 6 (top 
panel) and column (4) in Table 6 (bottom panel).Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable:
Hours per vehicle (hpv) 30.13 11.41 15.69 108.51
Activities:
Number of chassis configurations 2.67 2.46 0.75 23.10
Number of body styles 2.84 2.21 1.00 16.00
Number of (configurations + styles) 5.51 4.08 1.75 39.10
Number of models 2.11 1.04 1.00 6.00
Number of platforms 1.23 0.54 1.00 5.00
Flexibility index 1.09 0.34 0.50 3.33
In-sourcing index (inverse of outsourcing) 0.36 0.17 0.00 0.92
Instruments:
Confs + Styles in competing plants 5.41 2.62 2.18 13.73
Distance (from NA center, miles) 517.57 406.20 61.99 1915.07
Distance (from country center, miles) 309.75 314.71 17.45 1918.01
Area 2449690 974434 216345 5501700
Mass relief 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Controls:
Log capacity 12.15 0.44 9.30 13.07
Pre-1998 dummy 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Canadian plant 0.20 0.39 0.00 1.00
Mexican plant 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Foreign-owned plant 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Number of observations 860
Number of unique plants 92
Source: The Harbour Reports (various years)
Table 1: Summary statistics (1994-2004)sample period
1974 1984 1994 2004
Models for sale in North America 185 228 273 320
Models for sale in United States 133 195 238 282
    Car models 96 140 164 167
    Car variations 468 503
    Light truck models 37 55 74 115
    Light truck variations 558 1805
Models produced in North America 90 125 139 165
Assembly plants in North America 68 76 68 64
* Note: 1996
Source: Ward's Automotive Yearbook (various years) and Ward's Infobank (2004)
Table 3: Production variety in the sample
simple sum by plant take out duplicates
1994 2004 1994 2004
Platforms 101 98 70 75
Models 172 175 129 162
Body styles 175 235 143 206
Chassis configurations 182 206 147 176
Source: Own calculations based on statistics from The Harbour Reports (various years)






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1994 36.0% 10.1% 56.2% 82
1995 36.7% 9.8% 58.2% 84 16 13 61 8 23 -15
1996 34.7% 10.3% 53.3% 79 15 6 59 9 15 -6
1997 36.5% 11.3% 55.7% 78 29 16 37 27 53 -26
1998 38.5% 12.5% 58.9% 77 29 25 34 19 60 -41
1999 37.1% 12.3% 56.0% 77 20 19 42 -9 23 -32
2000 36.3% 12.0% 54.7% 77 11 19 53 -16 15 -31
2001 36.3% 11.7% 54.9% 78 19 16 46 3 24 -21
2002 35.7% 11.0% 54.6% 77 12 14 53 2 19 -17
2003 35.5% 11.0% 54.1% 76 6 9 64 -5 14 -19
2004 35.6% 11.8% 53.3% 75 14 12 54 -3 23 -26
Source: Own calculations based on statistics from The Harbour Reports (various years)
Table 4: Outsourcing indicators in the (plant level) sample
Fraction of tasks performed in-house Sum of changes across all tasks/plants
year
Number of plants thatDependent variable: hours per vehicle









Configurations + Styles 0.353***
(0.082)
Configurations * Styles 0.038**
(0.015)
Year * Variety -0.239 -0.334*** -0.067 -0.091* -0.055** -0.003
(0.147) (0.077) (0.043) (0.048) (0.024) (0.005)
Controls
Year -0.667*** -0.241 -0.754*** -0.707*** -0.649*** -0.749***
(0.234) (0.217) (0.177) (0.192) (0.191) (0.145)
Pre-1998 dummy -0.393 -0.461 -0.268 -0.053 -0.076 -0.318
(0.948) (0.935) (0.945) (0.959) (0.948) (0.954)
Scale -12.192*** -12.077*** 11.853*** -12.028*** -11.998*** -11.915***
  (log Capacity) (0.731) (0.723) (0.728) (0.741) (0.733) (0.736)
Canada -1.343* -1.681** -1.555** -1.738** -1.564** -1.724**
(0.749) (0.729) (0.741) (0.747) (0.742) (0.747)
Mexico 9.260*** 8.802*** 9.654*** 10.184*** 9.683*** 10.164***
(1.113) (1.103) (1.095) (1.095) (1.095) (1.099)
Foreign-owned -6.357*** -5.899*** -5.821*** -5.941*** -5.831*** -5.948***
(0.778) (0.759) (0.771) (0.778) (0.771) (0.778)
mid-size cars 1.586 0.921 1.385 1.702 1.575 1.511
(1.025) (1.012) (1.022) (1.034) (1.023) (1.031)
sport cars 4.319*** 4.446*** 4.441*** 4.518*** 4.419*** 4.513***
(1.510) (1.482) (1.504) (1.521) (1.507) (1.519)
luxury cars 7.361*** 7.041*** 9.277*** 9.833*** 9.453*** 9.751***
(1.628) (1.577) (1.520) (1.530) (1.519) (1.530)
pickup trucks -0.874 -0.033 -2.429** -1.768 -2.625** -1.600
(1.000) (0.994) (1.073) (1.088) (1.104) (1.062)
SUVs 2.833*** 2.029* 1.849* 2.992*** 2.273** 2.814***
(1.074) (1.076) (1.121) (1.082) (1.086) (1.085)
minivans 5.861*** 4.955*** 5.703*** 5.688*** 5.604*** 5.833***
(1.397) (1.391) (1.393) (1.408) (1.396) (1.407)
vans 5.552*** 5.517*** 4.464*** 4.792*** 4.063*** 5.086***
(1.388) (1.366) (1.431) (1.466) (1.460) (1.436)
Constant 1508.3*** 653.6 1679.1*** 1587.4*** 1471.0*** 2016.7***
467.5 433.8 353.9 384.1 383.3 289.6
Observations 860 860 860 860 860 860
R
2 0.539 0.552 0.541 0.532 0.540 0.532
Note: Estimation by least squares on the entire sample; standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at the 10%
level, ** 5%, *** 1%
Measures of Variety:
Table 5: Productivity penalty associated with production of greater variety
36Dependent variable: hours per vehicle
Estimation method:          
(instrumented)
OLS GMM        
(Flex)
GMM        
(Insource)
GMM        
(Ins, Flex)
GMM        
(Ins,Flex,Var)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variety 1.618*** 2.729** 2.424** 4.915*** 2.261
  (Configurations + Styles) (0.436) (1.345) (0.959) (1.625) (3.056)
Insourcing 9.455*** 7.453* 11.584 13.203*** 13.072***
  (1-Outsourcing) (2.860) (4.467) (8.345) (3.955) (3.498)
Flexibility 2.600 15.233 14.529** 22.413*** 14.627**
  (Platforms per line) (2.012) (10.557) (5.633) (6.755) (7.389)
Variety * Insourcing -1.622*** -1.272 -1.540 -0.638** -0.828**
(0.488) (0.866) (1.580) (0.280) (0.344)
Variety * Flexibility -0.292 -1.654 -1.639** -3.845*** -1.358
(0.273) (1.143) (0.749) (1.544) (1.079)
Flexibility * Insourcing -1.139*** -1.243*** -24.424** -21.321*** -17.518***
(0.334) (0.348) (11.710) (7.329) (5.887)
R
2 0.554 0.531 0.453 0.141 0.100
F-test for instrument validity: F(k,860-k) test statistic (p-value in brackets) 
Variety 13.74 (0.00)
Insourcing  3.68 (0.00) 2.70 (0.00) 4.44 (0.00)
Flexibility  1.91 (0.05) 3.19 (0.00) 2.10 (0.02)
Variety * Insourcing 2.07 (0.03) 3.00 (0.00) 1.83 (0.04)
Variety * Flexibility  2.42 (0.01) 5.00 (0.00) 5.95 (0.00)
Flexibility * Insourcing 16.21 (0.00) 2.31 (0.03) 2.03 (0.02) 3.31 (0.00)
Hansen J statistic for overidentification test of all instruments: χ
2(k) test statistic (p-value in brackets)
(k differs by column) 5.56 (0.14) 4.10 (0.25) 9.01 (0.25) 8.09 (0.32)
Hausman specification tests: χ
2(20) test statistic (p-value in brackets)
against (5) 41.87 (0.03) 21.98 (0.34) 11.95 (0.92) 3.31 (>0.999)
against (4) 15.62 (0.74) 12.84 (0.88) 6.74   (0.99)
Omitting control variables from the Hausman specification test  - χ
2(6) test statistic
against (5) 22.50 (0.00) 12.58 (0.05) 7.34 (0.29) 1.98 (0.92)
against (4) 9.54 (0.14) 8.20 (0.22) 5.99 (0.42)
Note: Variety, flexibility and insourcing are measured as continuous variables. Instruments are the variety of
competing firms (for variety), distance to industry center for North America and within the plant's country (for
insourcing), and plant area and a dummy for tag shift relief (for flexibility). Interactions of instruments are
included as well. The same set of controls as in Table 5 are included (reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix). *
significant at the 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 6: Productivity regressions under different exogeneity assumptions
37Dependent variable: hours per vehicle
i.i.d. errors Firm FE Plant RE Plant FE
(4) (6) (7) (8)
Variety 4.915*** 6.081** 4.268** 7.476***
(1.625) (2.433) (1.835) (1.742)
Insourcing 13.203*** 28.505*** 23.195** 20.477**
(3.955) (8.830) (9.709) (8.757)
Flexibility 22.413*** 10.307** 8.535** 10.711**
(6.755) (5.622) (4.353) (4.714)
Variety x Insourcing -0.638** -4.401* -4.794* -7.044**
(0.280) (2.545) (2.717) (2.523)
Variety x Flexibility -3.845*** -3.321* -1.393 -2.984***
(1.544) (1.888) (1.386) (1.111)
Flexibility x Insourcing -21.321*** -14.772* -12.124 -9.300
(7.329) (8.474) (11.254) (8.272)
R
2 0.141 0.279 0.312 0.619
F-test for instrument validity: F(k,860-k) test statistic (p-value in brackets) 
Insourcing 2.70 (0.00) 2.23 (0.01) 2.37 (0.00) 2.57 (0.00)
Flexibility 3.19 (0.00) 3.11 (0.00) 2.28 (0.01) 2.40 (0.00)
Variety * Insourcing 3.00 (0.00) 4.41 (0.00) 3.33 (0.00) 3.88 (0.00)
Variety * Flexibility 5.00 (0.00) 3.81 (0.00) 3.40 (0.00) 2.50 (0.00)
Flexibility * Insourcing 2.03 (0.02) 3.27 (0.00) 2.88 (0.00) 2.46 (0.00)
Table 7: Productivity regressions controling for unobserved heterogeneity
Note: Estimation is with GMM, using instruments for insourcing and flexibility. The same set of controls as in
Table 5 are included (reported in Table A.1). Results in column (4) treat all errors as i.i.d., in column (6) firm-
fixed effects are included, in column (7) errors are allowed to be correlated across plants (random effects
estimator), and in column (8) plant-fixed effects are included. * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
IV (Insourcing & Flexibility)
38Dependent variable: hours per vehicle




(4) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Variety 4.915*** 0.199*** 5.333*** 11.198*** 3.838*** 5.382
(1.625) (0.050) (1.715) (3.418) (1.201) (3.989)
Insourcing 13.203*** 0.991*** 10.417 29.887** 8.996** 13.237***
(3.955) (0.347) (11.643) (12.837) (4.353) (5.181)
Flexibility 22.413*** 0.563*** 19.523*** 13.018* 32.347** 17.026***
(6.755) (0.157) (6.009) (7.391) (15.575) (5.891)
Variety x Insourcing -0.638** -0.025*** -0.426* -1.132*** -4.215*** -0.736**
(0.280) (0.008) (0.196) (0.321) (1.463) (0.310)
Variety x Flexibility -3.845*** -0.136*** -5.060*** -3.782* -6.220** -4.102**
(1.544) (0.051) (1.747) (1.947) (2.837) (1.760)
Flexibility x Insourcing -21.321*** -0.513** -13.446* -10.008 -6.989** -22.806***
(7.329) (0.207) (7.887) (14.928) (3.469) (8.149)
Variety x Scale -0.064
(0.253)
Number of observations 860 860 615 780 860 860
R
2 0.141 0.072 0.104 0.091 0.127 0.141
Table 8: Robustness check on complementarities
Note: Estimation is with GMM, using instruments for insourcing and flexibility. The same controls as in Table 5
are included (reported in Table A.1). * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
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(i) (ii) (iii)
Endogenous variables




Flexible technology 13.512*** -0.187
(5.022) (0.154)
Instruments






Distance to NA center -0.035
(0.063)
Distance to country-center 0.117**
(0.063)
Controls
Scale 0.884* -0.020 -0.007
Year -0.197* 0.016* -0.002
Pre-1998 dummy -0.804 0.045 -0.007
Canada -0.163 -0.032 0.030
Mexico 1.029 0.052 0.001
Foreign-owned -1.969 0.155* 0.159***
Stretched platform 3.559*** -0.228*** -0.057
mid-size cars -0.571 0.036 0.052**
sport cars 0.662 -0.032 -0.005
luxury cars -4.500** 0.283*** -0.070
minivans -1.663 0.111 0.091**
SUVs -0.574 0.006 -0.038
pickup trucks 1.982** -0.110** -0.010
vans 1.638 -0.047 0.019
Constant (U.S. location and owne 368.778 -31.110* 5.102
R
2 0.086 0.105 0.111
Table 9: Direct estimation of the first order conditions for the three activities
Note: Estimation is with GMM using the excluded instruments in each equation as instruments for the included
endogenous variables: variety, insourcing and/or flexibility. * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
40Dependent variable: hours per vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Year -0.922*** -0.957*** -1.528*** -1.159*** -1.436*** -0.625*** -0.820*** -0.898*** -0.038*** -1.232*** -0.889*** -0.587* -1.155***
(0.134) (0.165) (0.546) (0.223) (0.275) (0.232) (0.176) (0.179) (0.006) (0.218) (0.205) (0.322) (0.238)
Pre-1998 dummy -0.024 -0.143 -5.568 -3.366** -4.137** -0.273 -0.739 -0.280 -0.112** -3.020** -1.317 -3.518**
(0.945) (1.065) (3.669) (1.625) (1.615) (1.462) (1.096) (1.032) (0.044) (1.302) (1.522) (1.780)
Scale -11.880*** -11.230*** -10.731*** -10.488*** -11.047*** -12.376*** -4.414** -0.748 -0.269*** -9.741*** -9.452*** -9.580*** -10.395***
(0.723) (1.078) (1.395) (1.326) (1.354) (1.278) (1.806) (2.251) (0.034) (1.327) (1.369) (1.627) (1.916)
Canada -1.400* -1.341** -3.692*** -4.028*** -2.337** -3.603*** -1.323 -0.095*** -3.359*** -0.679 -0.179 -4.347***
(0.736) (0.669) (1.292) (1.104) (1.186) (1.297) (2.470) (0.030) (1.176) (0.709) (0.995) (1.201)
Mexico 9.464*** 8.722*** 11.963*** 11.606*** 8.780*** 11.838*** 19.721*** 0.297*** 5.247*** 10.150*** 11.980***
(1.087) (1.673) (2.591) (2.265) (2.276) (2.368) (4.200) (0.053) (1.775) (2.302) (2.362)
Foreign-owned -6.721*** -6.948*** 15.937 10.672 6.763 0.000 -1.368 0.178 6.391 -8.231*** -8.413* -12.615
(0.812) (0.932) (10.331) (7.352) (5.138) (0.000) (10.522) (0.192) (7.422) (2.259) (4.308) (8.348)
Stretched platform 2.039*** 2.971** 2.208** 2.518* 4.148** -1.805 0.913 2.294 0.112** 3.350** 3.320*** 1.680 1.782
(0.750) (1.495) (1.025) (1.520) (1.635) (2.133) (2.328) (2.467) (0.045) (1.696) (0.866) (1.572) (1.559)
mid-size cars 1.663 1.370 2.659 1.587 1.462 2.361 7.229** 8.862 -0.033 -1.452 0.560 4.178** 1.908
(1.014) (1.061) (1.843) (1.640) (1.570) (1.581) (3.623) (7.192) (0.044) (1.721) (1.325) (1.724) (1.905)
sport cars 4.504*** 4.982*** 4.680** 5.143** 4.617** 4.770** 4.450 -2.644 0.103* 3.050 5.032** 8.740*** 5.259**
(1.488) (1.743) (2.318) (2.266) (2.208) (2.318) (4.120) (7.585) (0.058) (2.556) (1.972) (2.769) (2.383)
luxury cars 9.138*** 7.479*** -2.433 -0.957 -2.286 12.718*** 10.224* 7.400 -0.047 -4.851 6.059* 3.516 -0.396
(1.575) (2.850) (5.369) (4.097) (3.964) (4.605) (6.208) (9.198) (0.114) (5.020) (3.180) (4.858) (4.285)
pickup trucks -2.404** -1.733 -3.468* -4.434** -6.479*** -5.052** 1.859 4.985 -0.134*** -0.463 -3.290** -5.284*** -4.544**
(1.100) (1.373) (1.986) (1.783) (2.008) (2.193) (3.042) (8.776) (0.051) (2.096) (1.456) (1.576) (1.980)
SUVs 2.012* 2.161** -0.742 -0.107 -1.552 4.200** 9.942*** 13.693* -0.014 -0.281 2.486* 4.449** -0.060
(1.095) (0.992) (1.866) (1.597) (1.799) (1.799) (3.320) (8.053) (0.045) (1.778) (1.447) (1.881) (1.852)
minivans 4.691*** 4.519*** 6.179*** 4.786** 3.138* 5.857*** 10.291* 14.459 0.112** 4.002* 2.897 3.165* 5.501**
(1.424) (1.264) (2.358) (2.023) (1.799) (2.182) (5.470) (11.789) (0.053) (2.234) (1.991) (1.838) (2.416)
vans 4.442*** 5.423*** 4.611* 3.429* -0.212 0.701 12.623*** 13.648 0.107* 6.434*** 5.434*** 3.955** 3.212
(1.450) (1.577) (2.770) (1.967) (2.586) (2.499) (4.431) (12.589) (0.055) (2.410) (1.893) (1.917) (2.159)
Constant 2005.8*** 2057.5*** 3175.0*** 2415.0*** 2984.6***1366.5`*** 1663.9*** 1766.2*** 80.4*** 2558.7*** 1845.5*** 1300.6*** 2410.4***
(269.2) (327.8) (1081.7) (443.1) (557.4) (465.5) (362.3) (375.0) (12.7) (430.0) (409.2) (655.9) (476.5)
Table A.1: Coefficient estimates on the control variables for all regressions in Table 6 to Table 8
Note: Column numbers refer to Tables 6 to 8; sample and estimation methods are indicated in the respective tables; * significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%